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Does the external monitoring effect of financial analysts deter 
corporate fraud in China? 
 
Jiandong Chen, Douglas Cummings, Wenxuan Hou, and Edward Lee

 
Abstract 
We examine whether analyst coverage influences corporate fraud in China. The fraud triangle 
specifies three main factors, i.e. opportunity, incentive, and rationalization. On the one hand, analysts 
may reduce the fraud opportunity factor through external monitoring aimed at discouraging 
managerial misconduct, which can moderate agency problems. On the other hand, analysts may 
increase the fraud incentive factor by pressurizing managers to achieve short-term performance 
targets, which can exacerbate agency problem. In either case, the potential influence of analysts on 
the fraud rationalization factor may be more pronounced among firms that are more dependent on the 
capital market for corporate finance. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms, we show a negative 
association between corporate fraud propensity and analyst coverage, and that this effect is more 
pronounced among non-state-owned enterprises (NSOEs), which are more reliant on the stock market 
for external funding. These findings suggest that analyst coverage contributes to corporate fraud 
deterrence in emerging economies characterized by weak investor protection. The main policy 
implication is that further development of the analyst profession in emerging economies may benefit 
investors and strengthen business ethics. 
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1. Introduction 
We examine the influence of financial analyst coverage on corporate fraud among Chinese firms. 
Corporate fraud is a core research topic in the business ethics literature since such misconduct can 
generate serious negative consequences for stakeholders (Davidson and Worrell, 1988), employees 
(Zahra et al., 2005), and the wider society (Szwajkowski, 1985). Financial analysts are crucial to the 
efficiency of the capital market through their function as information intermediaries between 
managers and investors (Healy and Palepu, 2001). China is an aspiring emerging country with strong 
economic growth that is becoming increasingly reliant on the capital market, but at the same time is 
characterized by poor investor protection (Allen et al., 2005) and weak influence from auditing 
services and the business media. In such institutional environments, as are common across emerging 
economies, do financial analysts exert a positive or a negative effect on corporate fraud deterrence?  
We contextualize the role of analysts through the conceptual framework of the fraud triangle 
(Cressey, 1953), i.e. opportunity, incentives, and rationalization. We argue that analysts may either 
reduce the opportunity or increase the incentives of managers to carry out fraud, but through either 
pathway the potential influence of analysts on managers’ rationalization of fraud behavior will be 
greater among firms that are more dependent on the capital market for external funding. China 
provides a suitable research setting in which to examine these assertions, for two reasons. First, due to 
the country’s weaker information environment (Piotroski and Wong, 2011), the importance of analyst 
coverage to the individual investors may be greater than in many other countries. Second, due to 
differences in government financial support across firms (Chen et al., 2010), it is easier to identify 
firms with a greater reliance on the capital market for corporate finance. However, the literature on 
corporate fraud in China has so far largely focused on internal governance mechanisms (e.g. Chen et 
al., 2006; Jia et al., 2009) and has paid less attention to the influence of external information 
intermediaries. Therefore, we contribute to the business ethics literature by providing empirical 
evidence from a leading emerging economy on the role of financial analysts in the fraud triangle. 
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Financial analysts may reduce the opportunity factor in the fraud triangle because they can serve 
as external monitors of managers, reducing the agency problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), and 
because their coverage may contribute to investor protection (Lang et al., 2004). Analysts are 
considered to be sophisticated users of financial statement information, with an industry background, 
experience in tracking the firm they follow, active engagement with managers to acquire information, 
and the expertise to detect abnormal changes in operating performance (Yu, 2008). Managers also 
consider the opinions of analysts to be highly important because they can influence the share price 
and the market value of their firms (Graham et al., 2005). In practice, there is also evidence that 
analysts contributed to the exposure of fraud in firms such as Compaq, Gateway, and Motorola (Dyck 
et al., 2010).  
However, financial analyst may also increase the incentive factor in the fraud triangle because 
their coverage could create pressure on managers to meet performance targets (Degeorge et al., 1999), 
which could in turn increase the agency problem and motivate the manipulation of financial 
statements. Empirical evidence shows greater earnings management among firms that just meet or 
beat analyst earnings forecasts (Matsumoto, 2002). Existing studies also question the independence 
of financial analysts (Michaely and Womack, 1999; Hong and Kubik, 2003), suggest that they can be 
influenced by social context (Fogarty and Rogers, 2005), and document that their forecasts of firm 
performance tend to be optimistically biased (Boni and Womack, 2003; Chan et al., 2008).  
Financial analysts also have the potential to influence the rationalization factor of the fraud 
triangle. Since analysts can affect the opinions of investors, managers of firms that are more reliant on 
external funding supplied by the capital market are expected to be more sensitive to the influence of 
analyst coverage. Existing studies suggest that managers make cost and benefit analyses to rationalize 
their decisions over whether or not to carry out corporate fraud (Hannan et al., 2006; Tsang, 2002). In 
firms that are more reliant on capital market funding, the cost of fraud would be greater if detected by 
analysts because of the negative share price response that would ensue, and the benefits of fraud 
could also be greater in terms of meeting and beating analyst forecasts, because the share price may 
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be propped up.  
In the case of China, financial analysts’ research is expected to be important for investors’ 
decision making given the weak corporate information environment. For instance, Fang et al. (2014) 
provide empirical evidence that analyst coverage reduces audit fees in China, and that analyst 
influence is greater among firms with reduced or weaker auditing services. The existing literature 
attributes poorer transparency among Chinese firms to reasons such as poor investor protection 
(Morck et al., 2000) and state influence in the economy (Piotroski and Wong, 2011). Apart from this, 
capital market regulations associated with IPOs (Aharony et al., 2000), rights issues (Chen and Yuan, 
2004), and delisting (Liu and Lu, 2007) also establish accounting performance targets that increase 
the motives for firms to manage earnings. Furthermore, there is low demand in China for independent 
and high-quality auditing services to verify financial reporting (Wang et al., 2008). 
An institutional feature that could moderate the influence of analysts on the managers of Chinese 
firms is the financial support provided by the government in China. The existing literature (e.g. Allen 
et al., 2005; Chen et al., 2010) suggests that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China receive greater 
financial support through favorable loans from state banks and government subsidies than their 
counterparts that are non-state-owned enterprises (NSOEs). Since listed NSOEs have greater 
dependence on external funding from the capital market, they are expected to be more responsive and 
accountable to outside investors. For instance, empirical studies confirm that executive pay is more 
sensitive to stock return performance (Firth et al., 2006) and auditing quality has greater influence on 
the cost of equity capital (Chen et al., 2011) among NSOEs than SOEs. 
To test our assertions about the role of financial analysts in the fraud triangle, we conduct 
empirical analyses on a sample of Chinese listed firms over the period of 2003 to 2008. We acquire 
enforcement actions against corporate fraud from the China Center for Economic Research (CCER) 
database. To strengthen the robustness of our analyses, we measure financial analyst coverage through 
three proxies, separately, i.e. the number of research reports issued for the firm, the number of analysts 
following the firm, and the number of brokerage houses that issue analyst reports on the firm. The number 
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of research reports issued gives a direct indication of the level of information supplied to the market, while 
the numbers of analysts and brokerage houses both indicate the degree to which the profession caters to 
the market demand for information about the firm. Across all these proxies, we consistently observe a 
significantly negative relationship between analyst coverage and corporate fraud propensity among 
NSOEs but not SOEs. Our findings are also robust to controls of firm characteristics, governance, and 
industry and regional effects. Further analyses reveal NSOEs to be associated with a more negative share 
price response to the announcement of corporate fraud enforcement, and this is corroborated by a greater 
decline in operating performance in the following year. This is consistent with NSOEs incurring more 
negative economic consequences upon the detection of fraud, possibly because investors assume they are 
more risky since the government provides them with less financial support. 
Our empirical evidence suggests that, in the fraud triangle, financial analysts’ effect in reducing 
the fraud opportunity factor is greater than their effect in increasing the fraud incentives factor. The 
observation that financial analysts contribute to fraud deterrence is consistent with the argument that 
they provide an external monitoring effect that reduces agency problems (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Healy and Palepu, 2001). Meanwhile, our findings may also suggest that financial analyst coverage 
indeed has more of an influence on the fraud rationalization factor among firms that are more reliant 
on the capital market for funding. This implies that the cost and benefit analyses that managers apply 
to rationalize whether to pursue corporate fraud (Murphy and Dacin, 2011) can also be affected by 
corporate finance considerations. 
Our findings also provide two policy implications for China and other emerging economies. 
First, further development of the financial analyst profession may be socially beneficial because it 
could promote business ethics through fraud deterrence and could strengthen capital market 
efficiency by improving investor confidence. For instance, this may provide justification for 
exchange-sponsored analyst coverage, such as that implemented in Singapore. Second, we show that 
state control and support of listed firms moderates their accountability to the external monitoring 
provided by financial analysts, which could in turn harm minority shareholder protection. In other 
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words, further privatization of SOEs or a reduction of the government financial support provided to 
such firms may be beneficial to the development of the capital market and the wider economy, in 
China and other countries with similar institutional backgrounds. 
 Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses our theoretical framework, the 
institutional setting, and the development of our hypotheses. Section 3 describes our sample and 
methodologies. Section 4 presents our empirical findings. Section 5 provides our discussion and 
conclusion. 
 
2. Theories, setting, and hypotheses 
2.1 Theoretical framework 
 The fraud triangle refers to a set of three factors that interact to determine the likelihood of 
corporate fraud, i.e. opportunity, incentives, and rationalization, and is credited to the seminal work of 
Cressey (1953). The opportunity factor is associated with the conditions or situations that enable 
fraud to be carried out without the risk of getting caught (Murphy and Dacin, 2011), such as the 
absence of controls or lack of sufficient oversight. For instance, a lack of internal governance or 
external scrutiny may allow managers to get away with inappropriately manipulated financial 
statements. The incentive factor is influenced by greed or perceived pressure to commit fraudulent 
behavior (Wilks and Zimbelman, 2004). Such pressure can arise for financial, professional, social, 
and self-esteem reasons. For instance, the need to meet an aggressive performance target can 
contribute to the fraud incentive. The rationalization factor provides justification for fraud and is 
influenced by attitude, character, values, or reasoning (Cohen et al., 2010). When opportunity and 
incentives exist, fraud is more likely when the managers can rationalize their self-serving gains made 
at the expense of the stakeholders. The fraud triangle framework is widely used by practitioners to 
predict the likelihood of corporate fraud, and incorporated in standards such as SAS 99 (AICPA, 2002) 
in the US and ISA 240 (IFAC, 2005) internationally.  
 Existing studies have identified variables both internal and external to organizations that may 
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influence the opportunity and incentive factors of the fraud triangle. Internal variables largely focus 
on governance characteristics and include board composition (Beasley, 1996; Dunn, 2004), top 
management (Baucus, 1994; Ashforth and Anand, 2003), and organizational culture (McKendall and 
Wagner, 1997). External variables largely focus on the environmental setting and include hostility 
(Baucus and Baucus, 1997), dynamism (Hansen et al., 1996), industry culture (Baucus and Near, 
1991), and industry concentration (McKendall and Wagner, 1997). The rationalization factor of the 
fraud triangle is more often related to psychological variables. Murphy and Dacin (2011) suggest 
three psychological elements: awareness, intuition, and reasoning. Reasoning occurs when 
individuals are aware that an act is fraudulent but lack the intuition as to whether they should engage 
in it, and therefore carry out a cost and benefits analysis (Hannan et al., 2006; J. Tsang, 2002) to 
inform their decision. 
Despite decades of research, there is mixed evidence on whether internal governance 
mechanisms contribute to corporate fraud deterrence (Berenson, 2003; Schnatterly, 2003), which 
makes it difficult to infer the role of these measures in the fraud triangle. For instance, Beasley (1996) 
finds reduced financial statement fraud among firms with more outside directors but also observes 
that the presence of an audit committee does not reduce fraud likelihood. Uzun et al. (2004) also 
observe that outside directors reduce fraud but find the presence of a nomination committee to 
increase the propensity of fraud. Denis et al. (2006) even observe that executive stock options can 
tempt managers into fraudulent behavior. Dyck et al. (2010) analyze a sample of US corporate fraud 
cases over the period from 1996 to 2005 and reveal that the internal governance mechanism, upon 
which the literature on fraud deterrence focuses, accounts for only a third of fraud detection.  
 Compared to internal governance mechanisms, the role of financial analysts in the fraud triangle 
has received relatively less attention in the literature. On the one hand, if analysts play their role as 
external monitors, then they are expected to reduce the fraud opportunity factor. Agency theory 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976) implies that financial analyst coverage could increase firm value 
because it reduces agency costs by facilitating monitoring. Healy and Palepu (2001) suggest that the 
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private information produced by analysts could help detect managerial misuses of firm resources. 
Chung and Jo (1996) suggest that analyst coverage increases corporate transparency and reduces 
perquisite consumption, asset transfers, and fraud. On the other hand, if analysts create excess 
performance pressure on managers, they may contribute to the fraud incentive factor. Positive 
accounting theory (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986) implies that managers have incentives to 
manipulate financial reporting whenever accounting numbers are used as a performance benchmark. 
Analysts’ earnings forecasts create an important threshold for managers (Dechow et al., 2003), with 
negative share price consequences if they are unable to meet them (Fuller and Jensen, 2002). In other 
words, it is theoretically possible for analyst coverage to contribute either to the reduction of 
opportunity or to the increase of incentives in the fraud triangle. Empirical evidence on the direction 
of the relationship between analyst coverage and fraud propensity can provide insights and help 
verify which of these two theorized effects dominates. 
2.2 Institutional setting 
Corporate fraud in China is likely to be motivated by two general factors. First, in a dynamic and 
fast-changing environment, managers are more likely to uncover opportunities to conduct fraud 
(Baucus and Near, 1991). For instance, the weak legal enforcement and investor protection in China 
(Allen et al., 2005) may not have kept up with the country’s high economic growth and fast transition 
into a market-oriented economy, and this could have resulted in loopholes in the rules and regulations, 
allowing firms to behave opportunistically. Second, regulatory pressure and financial needs could 
provide incentives to conduct fraud (Szwajkowski, 1985). For instance, firms must make two 
consecutive years of profits before they can be listed on an exchange (Aharony et al., 2000), firms 
must achieve a minimum return on equity of 10% for three continuous years before they can issue 
additional shares (Chen and Yuan, 2004), and listed firms making two consecutive years of losses are 
placed under special treatment status, with a further year of loss seeing them suspended from trading 
or delisted (Jiang and Wang, 2008). These regulations are intended to guide equity capital toward 
well-performing firms but inevitably create incentives to manipulate reported earnings performance. 
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Common forms of corporate fraud among Chinese listed firms range from false statements, to 
delaying information disclosure, to embezzlement (Chen et al., 2005). As the primary regulator of the 
Chinese securities exchanges, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) investigates and 
disciplines corporate fraud as part of its responsibility to oversee the capital markets. Apart from 
regular reviews and random inspections, the CSRC also responds to information and complaints 
about alleged fraud from external whistleblowers. Upon identification of fraud, the CSRC’s 
enforcement actions can range from internal and public criticism to formal criminal prosecution. 
Critics have questioned the CSRC’s ability to deal with fraud, especially under political pressure 
(Chen et al., 2005; Liebman and Milhaupt, 2008). However, similar issues also arise in developed 
economies such as the US; its Securities and Exchange Commission is also government funded, and 
is therefore also susceptible to political pressure (e.g. Correia, 2009). Existing empirical studies of 
corporate fraud in China reveal some evidence of the influence of internal corporate governance 
mechanisms. For instance, Chen et al. (2006) observe less likelihood of corporate fraud among firms 
with a higher proportion of non-executive directors and among those with separate persons serving as 
CEO and chairperson. They tentatively infer that independent directors provide a more effective 
monitoring role and that CEO duality encourages the abuse of managerial power. Jia et al. (2009) 
provide evidence that Chinese firms with larger and more active supervisory boards are likely to face 
more severe CSRC sanctions for fraud. 
 On the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges in China, the majority of the listed firms are 
SOEs. These firms began to be partially privatized and to issue shares that were traded on the stock 
exchanges in the early 1990s. Despite this, either the central government or local governments have 
retained sufficient shares to maintain control of these listed firms. The government exerts an 
influence on managerial issues such as asset disposal, mergers and acquisitions, and CEO 
appointments (Chen et al., 2010). Unlike the shareholder wealth maximization objective of their 
NSOE counterparts, the Chinese listed SOEs must carry out the socio-political objectives of the 
government. To support SOEs, the government provides financial assistance, which in turn reduces 
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the financial constraints and bankruptcy risk for such firms (Faccio et al., 2006). Financial assistance 
is provided through subsidies and favorable loans from state banks (Chen et al., 2008). State-owned 
banks often lend to SOEs for reasons other than their own profitability targets (Chen et al., 2010). 
In contrast, Chinese NSOEs face substantial barriers to accessing loans from state-owned banks, 
and loan-granting decisions are made on a more competitive basis (Linton, 2006). Due to the lack of 
government financial support, NSOEs are more sensitive to the discipline of outside investors 
through the stock market than their SOE counterparts. Empirical studies document that NSOEs have 
higher stock price informativeness (Gul et al., 2010), greater accounting conservatism (Chen et al., 
2010), higher-quality auditors (Wang et al., 2008), greater sensitivity of CEO turnover to share price 
performance (Conyon and He, 2008), and greater performance improvements following CEO 
turnover (Kato and Long, 2006a, b). In other words, NSOEs are expected to be more heavily 
influenced by investor opinion, which can in turn be influenced by analyst coverage. 
2.3 Hypothesis development 
 We formulate testable hypotheses by intersecting the aforementioned theoretical framework and 
institutional setting. The theoretical framework anchors on the fraud triangle, and suggests some of 
the roles potentially played by analysts. It was also discussed in that section how the existing 
literature, which focuses on the association between internal governance mechanisms and corporate 
fraud, yields mixed evidence. The institutional setting highlights factors associated with fraud among 
Chinese listed firms, and shows that existing empirical studies of China in this area focus more on the 
effect of internal corporate governance mechanisms. That section also discussed differences in the 
financial support received from the government by Chinese SOEs and NSOEs, which render the latter 
more accountable to outside investors.   
There are two reasons why financial analyst coverage may contribute to the reduction of the 
opportunity factor in the fraud triangle. First, analysts have more expertise and experience than 
individual investors (Lang et al., 2004), allowing them to track firm performance, identify abnormal 
patterns (Yu, 2008), offer early warnings, and even act as whistleblowers (Dyck et al., 2010) about 
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value-destroying managerial misconduct to regulatory authorities and external equity investors. In 
other words, analysts can alleviate the information asymmetry between managers and investors, 
which in turn contributes to the reduction of the agency problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Second, analysts are considered as social arbiters, qualified to access a firm and its leadership 
(Wiesenfeld et al., 2008). Therefore, the information provided by analysts reduces, for the 
shareholders and boards of directors, the complexity and uncertainty associated with appraising 
managerial performance (Wiersema and Zhang, 2011). Assessing managerial performance is difficult 
because it can be confounded by organizational and environmental factors beyond managerial control 
(Holmstrom, 1982). Analysts can, therefore, essentially facilitate the internal governance mechanism, 
reducing the agency problem.  
There are two reasons why financial analyst coverage may contribute to an increase in the 
incentives factor in the fraud triangle. First, since analysts have substantial influence over investor 
opinion and the share price (Givoly and Lakonishok, 1979; Frankel et al., 2006), their forecasts place 
excessive pressure on managers to achieve short-term performance targets (Degeorge et al., 1999) so 
as to avoid a negative share price response. The pursuit of short-term targets may not necessarily 
benefit long-run firm value, and managers are more likely to manipulate financial statements when 
such targets are based on accounting numbers (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). Second, there can be a 
conflict of interests between analysts’ role as information intermediaries and the motives of the 
brokerage houses that employ them, since the latter have an underwriting relationship with the firms 
(Dechow et al., 2000). As such, analysts may be more likely to issue biased forecasts (Veit and 
Murphy, 1996; Baker and Veit, 1998; Cote and Goodstein, 1999; Michaely and Womack, 1999; Hong 
and Kubik, 2003), which would reduce the quality of the information they provide to investors and 
essentially compromise their function as external monitors. 
Financial analyst coverage is also expected to influence the rationalization factor of the fraud 
triangle. Although this factor is often assumed to be associated with the character of the manager 
(Evans et al., 2001), rationalizing decisions as important as corporate fraud is also expected to be 
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influenced by the perceived economic costs and benefits to the firm (Hannan et al., 2006; Tsang, 
2002), which in turn reflect on managerial performance. As a result of analysts’ influence on investor 
confidence and the cost of capital, firms with a greater demand for external funding supplied by the 
capital market are likely to be more concerned about analysts’ opinions and more sensitive to the 
influence of analyst coverage. On the one hand, if analyst coverage reduces the fraud opportunity, 
then we would expect this influence to be stronger among firms with a greater need for capital market 
funding, due to the reinforcement effect of managerial rationalization against such misconduct. 
Managers of such firms are more likely to be concerned about the cost of attempting fraud in 
anticipation of a possibly earlier and greater investor backlash facilitated by analysts’ whistleblowing. 
On the other hand, if analyst coverage increases the fraud incentive, then we would also expect the 
reinforcement effect of managerial rationalization to strengthen this effect more among firms with a 
greater reliance on capital market funding. Managers of such firms are more likely to be worried 
about the drawback of not attempting fraud, in anticipation of a negative share price response to the 
failure to meet short-term performance targets established by analyst forecasts. 
China provides an interesting setting in which to evaluate the role of analysts in the fraud 
triangle. On the one hand, it has a weak corporate information environment (Piotroski and Wong, 
2011), which could increase the reliance of investors on the information provided by financial 
analysts. If this is the case, then analyst coverage will contribute to a reduction of the fraud 
opportunity factor. On the other hand, China also has weak investor protection (Allen et al., 2005), 
which could increase the agency problem and the managerial pursuit of short-term targets under 
analyst pressure. If this is the case, then analyst coverage will contribute to an increase of the fraud 
incentive factor. In terms of the influence of analyst coverage on the fraud rationalization factor, 
which we argue to be greater among firms with more dependence on capital market funding, we 
expect this to be more pronounced among NSOEs than SOEs as a result of the smaller amount of 
government financial support received by the former group of listed firms. Based on the 
aforementioned arguments, we formulate the following testable hypotheses: 
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H1a: Analyst coverage reduces the propensity for corporate fraud among listed NSOEs but not 
their SOE counterparts in China. 
 
H1b: Analyst coverage increases the propensity for corporate fraud among listed NSOEs but not 
their SOE counterparts in China. 
 
 If we observe empirical evidence consistent with hypothesis H1a but not H1b, then this will 
imply that analyst coverage exerts a positive influence on fraud deterrence in China, possibly because 
of the decrease in the opportunity factor outweighing the increase in the incentives factor in the fraud 
triangle. Alternatively, if we find evidence consistent with hypothesis H1b but not H1a, then this will 
suggest that analyst coverage impedes fraud deterrence in China, possibly due to the increase in the 
incentives factor dominating the decrease in the opportunity factor in the fraud triangle. The 
observation that the analyst impact on fraud propensity exists mainly in NSOEs rather than SOEs will 
imply that there is a reinforcement effect among firms with greater capital demands, possibly through 
the rationalization factor of the fraud triangle.  
There is one caveat to the interpretation that any contrast in findings between NSOEs and SOEs 
will be due to differences in the rationalization factor between these groups. It may instead simply be 
due to the greater impact of either the opportunity reduction or incentive increase among NSOEs. 
However, if the reduction of the fraud opportunity caused by analyst coverage is simply greater in 
NSOEs than SOEs, this will either suggest that analysts systematically provide less competent 
research on SOEs, or that investors in SOEs are generally less reliant on analysts as an information 
source. In either case, it would be difficult for the analysts of SOEs to justify their services to 
investors. Alternatively, if the increase in fraud incentives caused by analyst coverage turns out to 
simply be greater in NSOEs than SOEs, this will mean that the analysts of NSOEs systematically set 
higher performance targets that are more difficult for the managers of such firms to meet and beat. If 
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this is the case, firms are likely to frequently miss the performance targets established by analysts, 
which would imply that such analysts are systematically optimistic and would undermine their 
credibility. In other words, we argue that the differential effect of analyst coverage on fraud 
propensity between NSOEs and SOEs is likely to be influenced by the rationalization factor in the 
fraud triangle. 
Our hypotheses H1a and H1b are based on the assumption that Chinese listed NSOEs are more 
concerned about the opinion of external equity investors regarding corporate fraud than are the SOEs. 
An interesting research question that stems from this is whether external equity investors respond 
differently to the corporate fraud events of NSOEs relative to those of SOEs. Agency theory implies 
that corporate fraud signals to the market that firms have untrustworthy executives or ineffective 
governance mechanisms. The agency problem reduces expected future cash flow prospects or 
increases the discount rate due to the uncertainty about such firms, which in turn leads to a decline in 
the share price. Despite the agency costs for fraud-committing firms, SOEs are likely to receive 
greater government financial support and face less default risk than NSOEs. In other words, investors 
are likely to perceive the post-fraud performance of SOEs to be more likely to recover and less likely 
to deteriorate than that of NSOEs. As such, we expect the share price response to a fraud event to be 
more negative and subsequent operating performance to be worse for NSOEs than their SOE 
counterparts. As a result of government financial assistance, SOEs are also more likely to recover 
from the difficulties associated with corporate fraud than are NSOEs. Therefore we hypothesize that: 
 
H2: Stock market reactions to corporate fraud announcements are more negative among listed 
NSOEs than their SOE counterparts in China. 
 
H3: Operating performance following corporate fraud is lower among listed NSOEs than their 
SOE counterparts in China. 
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The existing literature suggests that, in an efficient capital market, stock price movements 
should reflect information about future earnings (e.g. Beaver et al., 1980; Ayers and Freeman, 2000). 
Thus, if we find empirical evidence that supports both hypotheses H2 and H3, this will imply that the 
asymmetrically more negative market reactions following corporate fraud among NSOEs are a 
rational response from investors to the subsequent performance they expect of the firms. 
Alternatively, if we find evidence in support of hypothesis H2 but not H3, then this may indicate that 
the investors have responded to corporate fraud events irrationally, possibly driven by rumors or 
herding.  
 
3. Sample and methodology 
3.1 Test of hypotheses H1a and H1b 
 To test hypotheses H1a and H1b, which predict a negative relationship between corporate fraud 
propensity and financial analyst coverage, we apply logistic regression analyses based on Equation 1 
below: 
 
ti
titititi
tititi
titititi
tititititi
AreaIndustry
SBsizeaBIndepBsizeaBmeeta
DualityaOwnConInstOwn
ForeignSTGrowthSize
NSOECoverageNSOECoverageFraud
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1,141,131,121,11
1,101,91,8
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
  
(1)
 
 
The dependent variable Fraud equals 1 if enforcement actions against corporate fraud occurred in the 
fiscal year in question and 0 otherwise. All independent variables are measured at the previous fiscal 
year end. Coverage is separately proxied by the number of financial analysts following the firm, the 
number of analyst reports issued for the firm, and the number of brokerage house that issue analyst 
reports on the firm. NSOE equals 1 if the firm is a non-state-owned enterprise and 0 otherwise. Size is 
 15 
firm size measured as the log of market capitalization. Growth is firm growth measured as the 
price-to-book ratio. ST equals 1 for firms under special treatment (i.e. those with two consecutive 
years of losses) and 0 otherwise. Foreign equals 1 if the proportion of shares held by foreign 
shareholders is above the yearly cross-sectional median and 0 otherwise. InstOwn equals 1 if the 
proportion of shares held by mutual funds is above the yearly cross-sectional median and 0 otherwise. 
OwnCon is the ownership concentration, measured by the Herfindahl index and based on the 
ownership held by the ten largest shareholders in the firm. Duality equals 1 for firms with CEO also 
serving as board chairman and 0 otherwise. Bmeet equals 1 for firms with above the yearly 
cross-sectional median number of board meetings and 0 otherwise. Bsize equals 1 for firms with 
board size above the yearly cross-sectional median and 0 otherwise. Bindep equals 1 for firms whose 
proportion of independent directors is above the yearly cross-sectional median and 0 otherwise. 
SBsize equals 1 for firms with supervisory board size above the yearly cross-sectional median and 0 
otherwise. To control for industry effects, we define sector according to the first two digits of the 
Global Industry Classification Standards (GICS). To control for regional effects, we follow Firth et al. 
(2006) and classify firms into four different regions based on their level of economic and institutional 
development. 
The coefficient α1 indicates the relationship between fraud propensity and analyst coverage 
among SOEs. The coefficient α3 indicates the incremental relationship between fraud propensity and 
analyst coverage among NSOEs. If α3 < 0 and is statistically significant, this will indicate that analyst 
coverage reduces corporate fraud significantly more among NSOEs than SOEs, which will be 
consistent with hypothesis H1a. In other words, we will have evidence suggesting that analyst 
coverage reduces the opportunity factor, and that the effect is possibly reinforced by the 
rationalization factor in the fraud triangle. Alternatively, if α3 > 0 and is statistically significant, this 
will suggest that analyst coverage increases corporate fraud significantly more among NSOEs than 
SOEs, which will be consistent with hypothesis H1b. This will provide evidence that analyst 
coverage increases the incentive factor, with the influence possibly reinforced by the rationalization 
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factor in the fraud triangle. 
 
3.2 Test of hypotheses H2 and H3 
To test hypotheses H2 and H3, which predict that the share price response to fraud events is more 
negative and earnings performance following fraud is lower among NSOEs, we implement the 
following regression analyses in the corporate fraud sub-sample:  
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The dependent variable of Equation 2 is the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) around the 
announcement day of the enforcement action against corporate fraud. We calculate abnormal returns 
as the firm-specific return less the market index return, either on day 0 or over a five-day window (–2 
to +2) around the event. All other variables are defined as in Equation 1. A coefficient β1 < 0 will 
indicate that NSOEs are associated with more negative stock returns upon the disclosure of corporate 
fraud than their SOE counterparts, which will be consistent with our hypothesis H2. It is worth noting 
that there is a time period between the announcement of the beginning of an investigation and the 
announcement of enforcement action, and some of the information regarding the investigation may 
already have been incorporated into the share price by the time of the latter. If the market anticipates 
the full outcome of the investigation, then the announcement of enforcement action may not contain 
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new price-sensitive information. However, if this is true, then our focus on the announcement of 
enforcement action will only bias against us finding evidence consistent with our hypothesis. The 
dependent variable of Equation 3 is earnings performance in the fiscal year following enforcement 
action against corporate fraud. We apply either raw or industry-adjusted earnings per share. Obtaining 
coefficient γ1 < 0 will indicate that NSOEs are associated with lower earnings performance in the year 
after corporate fraud than are their SOE counterparts, which will be consistent with our hypothesis 
H3.  
 
3.3 Sample description 
  To carry out our empirical analyses, we obtain the archival data required for our analyses from either 
CCER (China Centre for Economic Research) or CSMAR (China Stock Market and Accounting 
Research). These data include whether regulatory enforcement action against corporate fraud is disclosed, 
the firms’ ownership status, the firms’ characteristics and performance, as well as the firms’ corporate 
governance variables. We identify 409 fraud cases over the six-year sample period of 2003 to 2008 for 
which valid data for all other variables required in our analysis are available. 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the variables used in our empirical analyses. Corporate 
fraud cases (Fraud) account for 4.5% of our total number of firm-year observations. Within our sample 
the average number of analyst reports issued to a firm (Report) is 4.481 per year, the average number of 
analysts following a firm (Analysts) is 2.872 per year, and the average number of brokerage houses that 
issue analyst reports on a firm (Broker) is 3.766 per year. Non-state-owned enterprises (NSOE) account 
for nearly a third of all our observations. The average firm size based on market capitalization (Size) is 
over 845 million RMB and, on average, this is three times the book value of the firms as indicated by the 
market-to-book ratio (Growth). Around 10% of all our observations are classified as special treatment 
(ST), i.e. firms that have reported two consecutive years of losses. While 7% of firms in our sample have 
foreign ownership, less than 3% have mutual fund ownership.   
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[insert Table 1 here] 
 
Table 2 presents the correlation analysis of the variables used in our study. Fraud has significantly 
negative correlation with the three analyst coverage variables: Report, Analyst, and Broker. It is also 
significantly higher among listed NSOEs, possibly because such firms have less government financial 
support and thus resort to fraud more often, perhaps to fulfil the stock exchange listing rules or to meet 
investor expectations. Firms that are smaller, have higher growth, or suffer losses tend to have more 
information asymmetry and therefore commit fraud more frequently. Mutual fund ownership is 
significantly correlated with fewer fraud cases, which implies that institutional investors exert a 
monitoring effect on firms. Ownership concentration also reduces corporate fraud, possibly because large 
block shareholders have more influence to discipline firms. Finally, firms with boards of directors that 
meet more frequently have less fraud, which is consistent with the board playing an internal governance 
function. 
 
[insert Table 2 here] 
 
4. Empirical findings 
4.1 Test of hypotheses H1a and H1b 
 Table 3 presents the logistic regression analyses of the relationship between corporate fraud 
propensity and financial analyst coverage, which is separately proxied by three measures, i.e. number 
of analysts following, number of reports issued, and number of brokerage houses. The coefficient for 
Coverage, which indicates the influence of analyst coverage on SOEs, is statistically insignificant for 
two out of three measures. This indicates that among the listed SOEs there is no robust evidence that 
variations in analyst coverage influence their propensity to commit fraud. The coefficient for NSOE, 
which indicates the propensity to commit fraud among NSOEs without analyst coverage, is 
significantly positive for all three measures of analyst coverage. For instance, using the number of 
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analysts following as the proxy for coverage, the coefficient of this variable is 0.257 (t-stat = 3.16). 
This observation suggests that NSOEs are more likely to commit fraud than SOEs when there is no 
following by analysts. One possible reason for this is that NSOEs enjoy less government support and 
the managers of such firms are less accountable to government discipline. 
 
[insert Table 3] 
 
 In Table 3, the coefficient for Coverage × NSOE indicates the incremental effect of analyst 
coverage on fraud propensity among NSOEs. Notice that this coefficient is consistently and 
significantly negative under all three measures of analyst coverage. For instance, using the number of 
reports to measure coverage, the coefficient is -0.079 (t-stat = -2.17). This suggests that NSOEs with 
higher analyst coverage have an incrementally lower likelihood to commit fraud, which is consistent 
with our hypothesis H1a and not with H1b. In other words, the net effect of analyst coverage among 
Chinese listed firms is the reduction of the opportunity factor rather than the increase of the incentive 
factor in the fraud triangle, and this impact exist only in NSOEs, possibly because of their dependence 
on capital market funding, which reinforces the analyst coverage effect through the managerial 
rationalization factor in the fraud triangle. 
Our findings are robust to the control of various firm characteristics and corporate governance 
variables, as well as industry and regional effects. Throughout Table 3, we observe a consistent and 
significant relationship between corporate fraud propensity and Size, ST, OwnCon, and Bmeet. The 
negative coefficient for Size and the positive coefficient for ST suggest that smaller and loss-making 
firms are more likely to commit corporate fraud, possibly because they have more information 
asymmetry or are in financial distress. The negative coefficients for OwnCon and Bmeet indicate that 
firms with more concentrated ownership and more frequent board meetings are less likely to commit 
fraud. This suggests that the internal governance mechanisms provided by blockholders and boards of 
directors have some effect in curbing fraud in both SOEs and NSOEs. 
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An alternative interpretation of this finding could be that analysts choose to cover firms they 
deem less likely to commit fraud. However, this does not explain why our findings exist only in 
NSOEs and not SOEs. It is difficult to substantiate the argument that analysts are selective only in 
NSOEs because analysts would lose credibility if they could not provide early warnings of fraud 
among SOEs as well. Furthermore, as indicated in our Equation 1, we apply a lead-lag approach by 
regressing the fraud variable for year t, on analyst coverage and other control variables in year t-1. 
This specification may reduce the likelihood that analyst coverage is reversely determined by fraud 
propensity, and may also reduce concerns over endogeneity between these variables. Finally, we also 
carry out Heckman two-stage analyses, as discussed later in Section 4.3. 
 
4.2 Test of hypotheses H2 and H3 
 Table 4 presents our results from the test of hypothesis H2, which predicts that the stock market 
reacts more negatively to corporate fraud enforcement announcements among NSOEs than SOEs. In 
Panel A we observe that the listed SOEs are associated with a 0.7% decline in value, relative to the 
market index on day 0 when enforcement action against their fraudulent behavior was disclosed. On 
the other hand, the NSOEs are associated with a 1.7% decline in value relative to the market portfolio 
upon the announcement of enforcement action. The difference between the two is statistically 
significant, and a similar pattern is observed when we use a longer, five-day (–2, +2) event window. 
Panel B shows that, based on the day 0 abnormal returns and those from the five-day window, the 
coefficients pertaining to NSOE are –0.012 (t-stat = –2.56) and –0.022 (t-stat = –1.79) respectively. 
This further confirms that the market reaction to corporate fraud is more negative among NSOEs than 
their SOE counterparts, after controlling for various firm characteristics and corporate governance 
variables. On the whole, Table 4 is consistent with our prediction in hypothesis H2 that NSOEs incur 
more negative economic consequences following corporate fraud. This is consistent with external 
investors anticipating lower cash flow prospects or attaching a higher discount rate to NSOEs 
following news of corporate fraud, possibly because the lack of government financial support makes 
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it more difficult for NSOEs to recover. 
 
[insert Table 4] 
 
Table 5 reports our test of hypothesis H3, which predicts that the operating performance in the 
year following corporate fraud will be lower among NSOEs than SOEs. Indeed, both Panels A and B 
reveal that the NSOEs’ raw and industry-median-adjusted earnings per share are significantly lower 
than those of their SOE counterparts one year after the respective corporate fraud events, which is 
consistent with our prediction in hypothesis H3. Mistrust and loss of reputation affects 
fraud-committing firms’ ability to acquire external capital. This may affect their ability to fund 
operations and investment, which would in turn reduce recovery and prolong the deterioration of 
performance. With less government financial support, a negative impact such as this is likely to be 
greater among NSOEs. The observation in Table 5 of significantly lower earnings performance 
among NSOEs following fraud also suggests that the more negative market reaction to such firms 
following enforcement actions against fraud is a rational anticipation of lower future cash flows and 
greater performance uncertainty. 
 
[insert Table 5] 
 
4.3 Additional tests 
 To strengthen the rigor and robustness of our findings consistent with hypothesis H1a, we carry 
out four sets of additional tests.
1
 First, we apply Heckman’s two-step regression approach to address a 
possible sample selection issue, i.e. that analysts may not choose which firms to follow randomly. In 
the first step, we model analyst coverage based on various firm characteristics, and obtain the inverse 
                                                 
1
 We gratefully appreciate the two reviewers for suggesting these additional tests, which enhance the robustness of our 
main findings. 
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Mills ratio. In the second step, we incorporate the inverse Mills ratio into our main regression test. 
The results, which are untabulated for brevity, include a coefficient on NSOE of 0.225 (t-stat = 3.86) 
and a coefficient on Coverage × NSOE of -0.076 (t=stat = -3.19). This indicates that NSOEs with no 
analyst coverage have a higher fraud propensity than SOEs, and analyst coverage leads to an 
incrementally lower fraud propensity among such firms, which is broadly similar to our main results 
reported in Table 3. Second, to account for the potential effect of non-tradable shares, we incorporate 
the ratio of tradable to total shares as an additional control variable. Variations in the proportion of 
tradable shares may influence firms’ sensitivity to share price movements in the capital market. This 
set of tests, the results of which are again untabulated for brevity, yields similar inferences to those of 
the main findings reported in Table 3. For instance, using the number of analysts as the measure for 
coverage, and in the presence of the ratio of tradable shares as an additional control, the coefficient on 
NSOE is 0.256 (t-stat = 3.15) and the coefficient on Coverage × NSOE is -0.096 (t=stat = -1.87). 
Third, we also carry out sensitivity analyses, which are once again untabulated for brevity, by 
excluding firms with zero analyst coverage. This enables us to observe whether the findings 
consistent with hypothesis H1a are indeed driven by cross-sectional variations in the level of analyst 
coverage, or are instead driven by whether the firm has analyst coverage or not. Across all three 
measures of analyst coverage, we obtain evidence broadly similar to our main findings in Table 3, 
even after excluding zero-coverage observations. Finally, to account for the identification problem 
due to the possibility that some firms may have committed fraud but have yet to be detected, we 
perform tests using a bivariate probit model with partial observability, following Chen et al. (2006). 
The results, again untabulated for brevity, suggest that the coefficients on the interactions between 
analyst coverage and the NSOE variables are significantly negative, which is consistent with our 
inferences from Table 3. Overall, our findings in line with the prediction in hypothesis H1a are robust 
to these additional tests. 
  
5. Discussion and conclusion 
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 Do financial analysts play a role in the fraud triangle? Using a sample of Chinese listed firms, we 
provide empirical evidence that financial analyst coverage is inversely associated with corporate 
fraud propensity, and especially among listed NSOEs. This implies that analysts contribute to the 
reduction of the opportunity factor in the fraud triangle, and the effect is more pronounced among 
firms receiving less government support and depending more on the capital market for external 
funding. This is consistent with firms that are more concerned about outside investor opinion being 
more sensitive to the external monitoring effect of financial analysts. Further analyses reveal that 
NSOEs are indeed associated with more negative market reactions upon the announcement of 
corporate fraud enforcement action by the regulatory authority. This is consistent with the 
dependence on the capital market for financing making it more costly for NSOEs to commit fraud due 
to the mistrust and loss of reputation that ensues from the discovery of such misconduct. We also 
provide evidence that NSOEs underperform their SOE counterparts in terms of operating 
performance following fraud. The observation that the performance of NSOEs declines more or 
recovers less after fraud corroborates such firms’ more negative share price response to the 
announcement of fraud. Our empirical findings are robust to controls of firm characteristics, 
corporate governance variables, industry and regional effects, as well as other sensitivity analyses. 
 The fraud triangle is widely used by the auditing profession to evaluate the likelihood of 
financial statement fraud (AICPA, 2002; IFAC, 2005), often through firms’ internal features 
associated with governance mechanisms and managerial characteristics. We adopt the fraud triangle 
as the conceptual framework of our study so as to rationalize and contextualize the influence of 
financial analysts, which is an external determinant that can affect each of the three factors, i.e. 
opportunity, incentives, and rationalization, in different ways. On the one hand, some of the existing 
literature (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Healy and Palepu, 2001) argues that financial analysts play a 
role as external monitors, reducing the agency cost of firms by reducing the information asymmetry 
that arises from the separation of ownership and control. Since corporate fraud is a manifestation of 
the agency problem, it is possible to argue that analyst coverage could contribute to the reduction of 
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the fraud opportunity factor. On the other hand, other existing work (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986) 
argues that managers have incentives to alter the financial statements whenever their performance 
appraisal is based on accounting numbers. Since analysts provide performance forecasts about firms, 
and whether firms meet or beat these targets can affect market value (Degeorge et al., 1999), analysts 
inevitably create performance pressure for managers and contribute to the increase of the fraud 
incentives factor. As for the fraud rationalization factor, the influence of analysts through either of the 
aforementioned pathways may at least partly depend on the degree to which a manager is concerned 
about investor opinion.  
As such, we contribute to the literature by highlighting how fraud triangle components such as 
the opportunity and incentive factors can be externally influenced. Since there is mixed evidence 
from existing research on the relationship between internal governance mechanisms and corporate 
fraud (Berenson, 2003; Schnatterly, 2003), variations in the propensity for such misconduct may be 
driven by other variables, and our study shows that the external effect from financial analysts is 
relevant. This may have practical implications for the fraud detection efforts of the auditing 
profession, because it could further increase its consideration of analyst-related features such as 
coverage, forecasted earnings, and affiliations with firms. In terms of policy implications, our 
findings imply that strengthening the analyst profession and its influence on the capital market in 
emerging economies such as China where there is a weak corporate information environment may be 
useful. For instance, independent analysts sponsored by regulatory agencies or stock exchanges may 
benefit investors, as long as such an approach would not create excess pressure on firms to meet and 
beat analyst forecasts. We also contribute to the literature by suggesting how the rationalization factor 
in the fraud triangle may be determined by managers’ economic reasoning (Hannan et al., 2006; 
Tsang, 2002) in additional to the psychological and cultural elements that influence managerial 
behavior. Since the demand for external financing through the capital market as opposed to 
government support makes the managers of Chinese NSOEs more sensitive to the external 
monitoring effect than their SOE counterparts, one possible avenue for further study would be to 
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examine whether the likelihood of CEO turnover following fraud is also greater among NSOEs than 
SOEs (Chen et al., 2014).  
Our findings also imply possible effects from institutional investors, the business media, and the 
regulatory environment on the fraud triangle factors. For instance, there is evidence of a higher 
likelihood to commit fraud among Chinese firms cross-listed in the US (Wang, 2012). From the 
perspective of the fraud triangle, a better regulatory environment in the US exchanges should reduce 
the fraud opportunity factor for Chinese firms. However, it appears that the pressure to meet US 
investor expectations and the requirements of the US exchanges may increase the fraud incentive 
factor for these Chinese cross-listing firms. The role of analysts in the fraud triangle may perhaps also 
vary across regions within China, due to variations in institutional development. This is why we 
controlled for regional effects in our empirical analyses, but such an influence could certainly be 
studied further in future research. 
Our evidence that analysts’ role in the fraud triangle may be moderated by state support of listed 
firms has policy implications for China and other emerging economies with similar institutional 
features. The existing literature suggests that political connections and government support, such as 
those enjoyed by Chinese SOEs, can be beneficial for firms in terms of performance and competition 
(Davis et al., 1997; Tsang, 1998). The rationale is that such connections and support compensate for 
insufficient infrastructure and the uncertain business environment (Atuahene-Gima and Li, 2002; Xin 
and Pearce, 1996). In our case, we confirm that government support for SOEs reduces the negative 
economic consequences experienced by those firms, compared to NSOEs, in the context of corporate 
fraud. However, the flip side is that it also reduces the effectiveness of external scrutiny exerted by 
financial analysts. This will not necessarily be beneficial for the minority shareholders of SOEs, 
which still account for the majority of listed firms on Chinese stock exchanges. The disadvantage to 
the minority investors is further exacerbated by the weak investor protection and information 
environment that characterizes the Chinese capital market (Allen et al., 2005).  
The efficient allocation of financial resources is a key determinant of economic development and 
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growth. Therefore, investor confidence in the capital market plays a vital role in the efforts of China and 
other emerging economies to develop sustainable economic growth. The experiences in developed 
Western countries over the past decade, from corporate scandals to financial crisis, have revealed the 
importance of corporate stewardship and governance to the efficiency of the capital market and the wider 
society. Therefore, developing and strengthening external governance mechanisms through sources such 
as financial analysts may strengthen investor confidence and business ethics, which will in turn enhance 
financial market liquidity. Our study provides insights from this perspective. 
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
 
This table presents the summary statistics of the variables used in our analysis. Our sample period covers 
2003 to 2008. Fraud equals 1 if enforcement actions against corporate fraud occurred in the current fiscal 
year and 0 otherwise. Report is the number of analyst reports issued for the firm. Analyst is the number of 
financial analysts following the firm. Broker is the number of brokerage houses that issue analyst reports on 
the firm. NSOE equals 1 if the firm is a non-state-owned enterprise and 0 otherwise. Size is firm size 
measured as the log of market capitalization. Growth is firm growth measured as the price-to-book ratio. ST 
equals 1 for firms under special treatment (i.e. those with two consecutive years of losses) and 0 otherwise. 
Foreign equals 1 if the proportion of shares held by foreign shareholders is above the yearly cross-sectional 
median and 0 otherwise. InstOwn equals 1 if the proportion of shares held by mutual funds is above the yearly 
cross-sectional median and 0 otherwise. OwnCon is ownership concentration, measured by the Herfindahl 
index and based on the ownership held by the ten largest shareholders in the firm. Duality equals 1 for firms 
with CEO also serving as board chairman and 0 otherwise. Bmeet equals 1 for firms with above the median 
number of board meetings and 0 otherwise. Bsize equals 1 for firms with board size above the cross-sectional 
median and 0 otherwise. Bindep equals 1 for firms whose proportion of independent directors is above the 
cross-sectional median and 0 otherwise. SBsize equals 1 for firms with supervisory board size above the 
cross-sectional median and 0 otherwise. 
 
Variables Mean Std.dev. Median Obs. 
Fraud 0.045 0.208 0.000 8274 
Report 4.481 10.447 0.000 8274 
Analyst 2.872 5.585 0.000 8274 
Broker 3.766 6.111 1.000 8274 
NSOE 0.334 0.472 0.000 8274 
Size 20.556 1.082 20.408 8274 
Growth 3.451 3.971 2.344 8274 
ST 0.092 0.289 0.000 8274 
Foreign 0.070 0.255 0.000 8274 
InstOwn 0.026 0.060 0.000 8274 
OwnCon 0.196 0.131 0.161 8274 
Duality 0.010 0.099 0.000 8274 
Bmeet 0.573 0.495 1.000 8274 
Bsize 0.372 0.483 0.000 8274 
Bindep 0.883 0.321 1.000 8274 
SBsize 0.888 0.315 1.000 8274 
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Table 2: Correlation analysis 
 
This table presents the correlation analysis of the variables used in our analysis. Our sample period covers 2003 to 2008. Fraud equals 1 if enforcement actions against corporate 
fraud occurred in the current fiscal year and 0 otherwise. Report is the number of analyst reports issued for the firm. Analyst is the number of financial analysts following the firm. 
Broker is the number of brokerage houses that issue analyst reports on the firm. NSOE equals 1 if the firm is a non-state-owned enterprise and 0 otherwise. Size is firm size measured 
as the log of market capitalization. Growth is firm growth measured as the price-to-book ratio. ST equals 1 for firms under special treatment (i.e. those with two consecutive years of 
losses) and 0 otherwise. Foreign equals 1 if the proportion of shares held by foreign shareholders is above the yearly cross-sectional median and 0 otherwise. InstOwn equals 1 if the 
proportion of shares held by mutual funds is above the yearly cross-sectional median and 0 otherwise. OwnCon is ownership concentration measured by the Herfindahl index and 
based on the ownership held by the ten largest shareholders in the firm. Duality equals 1 for firms with CEO also serving as board chairman and 0 otherwise. Bmeet equals 1 for firms 
with an above median number of board meetings and 0 otherwise. Bsize equals 1 for firms with board size above the cross-sectional median and 0 otherwise. Bindep equals 1 for 
firms whose proportion of independent directors is above the cross-sectional median and 0 otherwise. SBsize equals 1 for firms with supervisory board size above the cross-sectional 
median and 0 otherwise. * indicates statistical significance at the 5% level. 
 
 
Fraud 
 
Report 
 
Analyst 
 
Broker 
 
NSOE 
 
Size 
 
Growth 
 
ST 
 
Foreign 
 
InstOwn 
 
OwnCon 
 
Duality 
 
Bmeet 
 
Bsize 
 
Bindep 
 
SBSize 
Fraud 1.000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     Report -0.064 
* 
1.000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     Analyst -0.077 
* 
0.968 
* 
1.000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     Broker -0.089 
* 
0.742 
* 
0.941 
* 
1.000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     NSOE 0.061 
* 
-0.009 
 
-0.009 
 
0.001 
 
1.000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     Size -0.107 
* 
0.515 
* 
0.546 
* 
0.576 
* 
-0.142 
* 
1.000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     Growth 0.026 
* 
0.015 
 
0.016 
 
0.021 
 
0.071 
* 
0.160 
* 
1.000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     ST 0.123 
* 
-0.115 
* 
-0.134 
* 
-0.157 
* 
0.112 
* 
-0.231 
* 
0.166 
* 
1.000 
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0.038 
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0.051 
* 
0.067 
* 
0.088 
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0.018 
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-0.021 
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* 
0.572 
* 
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* 
0.628 
* 
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0.477 
* 
0.111 
* 
-0.113 
* 
0.011 
 
1.000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     OwnCon -0.071 
* 
0.026 
* 
0.031 
* 
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* 
-0.272 
* 
0.005 
 
-0.047 
* 
-0.110 
* 
-0.048 
* 
-0.057 
* 
1.000 
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0.028 
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0.009 
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1.000 
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-0.053 
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* 
0.045 
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-0.017 
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-0.010 
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-0.029 
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-0.117 
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0.051 
* 
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0.029 
* 
0.009 
 
0.050 
* 
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    Bindep -0.019 
 
0.072 
* 
0.087 
* 
0.111 
* 
0.133 
* 
0.034 
* 
-0.060 
* 
0.002 
 
0.029 
* 
0.130 
* 
-0.082 
* 
-0.005 
 
-0.040 
* 
-0.001 
 
1.000 
  SBSize -0.018 
 
0.013 
 
0.007 
 
-0.006 
 
-0.107 
* 
0.077 
* 
-0.008 
 
-0.044 
* 
-0.032 
* 
-0.001 
 
0.028 
* 
-0.026 
* 
-0.022 
 
0.052 
 
-0.003 
 
1.000 
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Table 3: Relation between fraud and analyst coverage (test of hypotheses H1a and H1b) 
 
This table presents the logistic regression analysis of the relationship between corporate fraud propensity and 
financial analyst coverage. Our sample period covers 2003 to 2008. The dependent variable Fraud equals 1 if 
enforcement actions against corporate fraud occurred in the current fiscal year and 0 otherwise. Coverage is 
separately measured by the number of analysts following, the number of reports issued, and the number of 
brokerage houses. NSOE equals 1 if the firm is a non-state-owned enterprise and 0 otherwise. Size is firm size 
measured as the log of market capitalization. Growth is firm growth measured as the price-to-book ratio. ST 
equals 1 for firms under special treatment (i.e. those with two consecutive years of losses) and 0 otherwise. 
Foreign equals 1 if the proportion of shares held by foreign shareholders is above the yearly cross-sectional 
median and 0 otherwise. InstOwn equals 1 if the proportion of shares held by mutual funds is above the yearly 
cross-sectional median and 0 otherwise. OwnCon is ownership concentration measured by the Herfindahl 
index and based on the ownership held by the ten largest shareholders in the firm. Duality equals 1 for firms 
with CEO also serving as board chairman and 0 otherwise. Bmeet equals 1 for firms with an above median 
number of board meetings and 0 otherwise. Bsize equals 1 for firms with board size above the cross-sectional 
median and 0 otherwise. Bindep equals 1 for firms whose proportion of independent directors is above the 
cross-sectional median and 0 otherwise. SBsize equals 1 for firms with supervisory board size above the 
cross-sectional median and 0 otherwise. Our t-statistics are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. *, **, and *** 
indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance respectively. 
 
 
Number of analysts 
following 
 
Number of analyst 
reports 
 
Number of brokerage 
houses 
 
Coeff 
 
t-stat 
 
Coeff 
 
t-stat 
 
Coeff 
 
t-stat 
Coverage -0.027 
 
(-1.03)  -0.003 
 
(-0.22) 
 
-0.036 
* 
(-1.70) 
NSOE 0.257 
*** 
(3.16)  0.264 
*** 
(3.30) 
 
0.269 
*** 
(3.27) 
Coverage × NSOE -0.098 
* 
(-1.86)  -0.079 
*** 
(-2.17) 
 
-0.068 
** 
(-1.99) 
Size -0.198 
*** 
(-4.74)  -0.209 
*** 
(-4.96) 
 
-0.186 
*** 
(-4.41) 
Growth 0.008 
 
(1.19)  0.009 
 
(1.24) 
 
0.008 
 
(1.13) 
ST 0.361 
*** 
(4.44)  0.364 
*** 
(4.48) 
 
0.347 
*** 
(4.26) 
Foreign -0.015 
 
(-0.09)  -0.023 
 
(-0.14) 
 
0.001 
 
(0.01) 
InstOwn -1.936 
 
(-1.37)  -2.841 
* 
(-1.81) 
 
-1.186 
 
(-0.91) 
OwnCon -1.232 
*** 
(-4.18)  -1.267 
*** 
(-4.29) 
 
-1.189 
*** 
(-4.06) 
Duality -0.076 
 
(-0.33)  -0.077 
 
(-0.33) 
 
-0.081 
 
(-0.35) 
Bmeet -0.277 
*** 
(-4.86)  -0.276 
*** 
(-4.85) 
 
-0.273 
*** 
(-4.76) 
Bsize 0.017 
 
(0.25)  0.010 
 
(0.15) 
 
0.019 
 
(0.27) 
Bindep -0.130 
 
(-1.57)  -0.136 
 
(-1.63) 
 
-0.122 
 
(-1.47) 
SBSize -0.098 
 
(-1.13)  -0.093 
 
(-1.08) 
 
-0.116 
 
(-1.33) 
Intercept 3.575 
*** 
(4.08)  3.033 
*** 
(3.26) 
 
2.935 
*** 
(3.19) 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Industry effect Yes 
 
  Yes 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Region effect Yes 
 
  Yes 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pseudo R2 0.135 
 
  0.134 
 
 
 
0.138 
 
 
Observations  8274 
 
  8274 
 
 
 
8274 
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Table 4: Stock market reactions to corporate fraud announcements (test of hypothesis H2) 
 
This table presents tests of the stock market reaction to corporate fraud announcements. Our sample period covers 2003 
to 2008. We use the sub-sample of firms with corporate fraud. The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return 
calculated as the firm-specific return less the market index return. Panel A applies the day 0 return and Panel B applies 
the cumulative return over a 5-day window (–2, +2). NSOE equals 1 if the firm is a non-state-owned enterprise and 0 
otherwise. Size is firm size measured as the log of market capitalization. Growth is firm growth measured as the 
price-to-book ratio. ST equals 1 for firms under special treatment (i.e. those with two consecutive years of losses) and 0 
otherwise. Foreign equals 1 if the proportion of shares held by foreign shareholders is above the yearly cross-sectional 
median and 0 otherwise. InstOwn equals 1 if the proportion of shares held by mutual funds is above the yearly 
cross-sectional median and 0 otherwise. OwnCon is ownership concentration, measured by the Herfindahl index and 
based on the ownership held by the ten largest shareholders in the firm. Duality equals 1 for firms with CEO also serving 
as board chairman and 0 otherwise. Bmeet equals 1 for firms with an above median number of board meetings and 0 
otherwise. Bsize equals 1 for firms with board size above the cross-sectional median and 0 otherwise. Bindep equals 1 for 
firms whose proportion of independent directors is above the cross-sectional median and 0 otherwise. SBsize equals 1 for 
firms with supervisory board size above the cross-sectional median and 0 otherwise. Our t-statistics are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity. *, **, and *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance respectively. 
 
Panel A 
 
 
     
 
CAR[0] 
 
Obs 
 
CAR[-2,+2] Obs 
Combined sub-sample -0.011 
 
396 
 
-0.017 
 
338 
SOE sub-sample -0.007 
 
238 
 
-0.010 
 
209 
NSOE sub-sample -0.017 
 
158 
 
-0.029 
 
129 
  
 
     Difference 0.009 
*** 
  
0.019 
*** 
 t-stat 2.854 
 
  
2.363 
  
  
 
     Panel B 
 
 
     
 
CAR[0] 
 
  
                    CAR[-2,+2] 
 
coeff 
 
t-stat 
 
coeff 
 
t-stat 
NSOE -0.012 
** 
(-2.56) 
 
-0.022 
* 
(-1.79) 
Size 0.000 
 
(0.17) 
 
0.016 
** 
(2.59) 
Growth 0.000 
 
(0.94) 
 
0.000 
 
(-0.25) 
ST 0.005 
 
(1.08) 
 
0.018 
 
(1.39) 
Foreign 0.009 
 
(0.76) 
 
0.025 
 
(1.45) 
InstOwn -0.092 
 
(-1.35) 
 
-0.285 
* 
(-1.85) 
OwnCon -0.023 
 
(-1.22) 
 
-0.050 
 
(-1.02) 
Duality 0.001 
 
(0.08) 
 
-0.025 
 
(-0.96) 
Bmeet 0.001 
 
(0.27) 
 
0.030 
*** 
(2.77) 
Bsize 0.001 
 
(0.15) 
 
-0.015 
 
(-1.09) 
Bindep 0.002 
 
(0.38) 
 
-0.017 
 
(-1.41) 
SBSize -0.003 
 
(-0.44) 
 
0.016 
 
(0.85) 
Intercept -0.018 
 
(-0.31) 
 
-0.335 
*** 
(-2.68) 
  
 
   
 
 Industry clustering Yes 
 
  
Yes 
 
 Adj R
2
 -0.002 
 
  
0.058 
 
 Obs 267 
 
  
225 
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Table 5: Earnings performance following corporate fraud (test of hypothesis H3) 
 
This table presents the analysis of earnings performance in the year following corporate fraud. Our sample period covers 
2003 to 2008. We use the sub-sample of firms with corporate fraud. The dependent variable is raw earnings per share in 
Panel A and industry-median-adjusted earnings per share in Panel B. NSOE equals 1 if the firm is a non-state-owned 
enterprise and 0 otherwise. Size is firm size measured as the log of market capitalization. Growth is firm growth 
measured as the price-to-book ratio. ST equals 1 for firms under special treatment (i.e. those with two consecutive years 
of losses) and 0 otherwise. Foreign equals 1 if the proportion of shares held by foreign shareholders is above the yearly 
cross-sectional median and 0 otherwise. InstOwn equals 1 if the proportion of shares held by mutual funds is above the 
yearly cross-sectional median or 0 otherwise. OwnCon is ownership concentration, measured by the Herfindahl index 
and based on the ownership held by the ten largest shareholders in the firm. Duality equals 1 for firms with CEO also 
serving as board chairman and 0 otherwise. Bmeet equals 1 for firms with an above median number of board meetings 
and 0 otherwise. Bsize equals 1 for firms with board size above the cross-sectional median and 0 otherwise. Bindep 
equals 1 for firms whose proportion of independent directors is above the cross-sectional median and 0 otherwise. SBsize 
equals 1 for firms with supervisory board size above the cross-sectional median and 0 otherwise. Our t-statistics are 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity. *, **, and *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance respectively. 
 
Panel A 
 
 
     
 
                    EPS 
 
Obs 
 
IndAdj EPS Obs 
Combined sub-sample -0.116 
 
381 
 
-0.288 
 
381 
SOE sub-sample 0.075 
 
199 
 
-0.092 
 
199 
NSOE sub-sample -0.326 
 
182 
 
-0.501 
 
182 
  
 
     Difference 0.401 
*** 
  
0.409 
*** 
 t-stat 4.167 
 
  
4.327 
  
  
 
     Panel B 
 
 
     
 
                       EPS 
 
  
IndAdj EPS 
 
 
coeff 
 
t-stat 
 
Coeff 
 
tstat 
NSOE -0.199 
*** 
(-2.96) 
 
-0.209 
*** 
(-3.17) 
Size 0.081 
** 
(2.42) 
 
0.067 
*** 
(2.12) 
Growth -0.009 
 
(-1.50) 
 
-0.010 
* 
(-1.66) 
ST 0.137 
* 
(1.89) 
 
0.123 
* 
(1.77) 
Foreign -0.015 
 
(-0.13) 
 
0.019 
 
(0.18) 
InstOwn 4.128 
*** 
(2.97) 
 
4.231 
*** 
(3.14) 
OwnCon 0.295 
 
(1.51) 
 
0.274 
 
(1.45) 
Duality 0.145 
* 
(1.74) 
 
0.132 
 
(1.61) 
Bmeet 0.004 
 
(0.06) 
 
0.002 
 
(0.02) 
Bsize 0.002 
 
(0.02) 
 
0.012 
 
(0.16) 
Bindep -0.013 
 
(-0.17) 
 
-0.028 
 
(-0.37) 
SBSize -0.276 
*** 
(-2.99) 
 
-0.251 
*** 
(-2.82) 
Intercept -1.439 
** 
(-2.05) 
 
-1.322 
** 
(-1.99) 
  
 
   
 
 Industry clustering Yes 
 
  
Yes 
 
 Adj R
2
 0.116 
 
  
0.114 
 
 Obs 381 
 
  
381 
 
 
  
 
      
